State Department Seemingly Buys $15,000 iPhone Cracking Tech GrayKey (vice.com) 79
An anonymous reader quotes a report from Motherboard: Grayshift, a company that offers to unlock modern iPhones for as little as $50 each, has caused a buzz across law enforcement agencies, with local police already putting down cash for the much sought-after tech. Now, it appears a section of the U.S. State Department has also purchased the iPhone cracking tool, judging by procurement records reviewed by Motherboard. Grayshift's iPhone product, dubbed GrayKey, can unlock devices running versions of Apple's latest mobile operating system iOS 11, according to marketing material obtained by Forbes. An online version of GrayKey which allows 300 unlocks costs $15,000 (which boils down to $50 per device), and an offline capability with unlimited uses is $30,000. According to a recent post from cybersecurity firm Malwarebytes, which obtained leaked details on GrayKey, the product itself is a small, four inch by four inch box, and two iPhones can be connected at once via lightning cables. Malwarebytes adds that the time it takes to unlock a device varies depending on the strength of the user's passcode: it may be hours or days. Notably, Grayshift includes an ex-Apple engineer on its staff, Forbes reported.
On March 6, the State Department ordered an item from Grayshift for just over $15,000, according to a purchase order listing available on the U.S. government's public federal procurement data system. The listing is sparse on details, putting the order under the generic label of "computer and computer peripheral equipment." But Motherboard confirmed that the Grayshift in the State Department listing is the same as the one selling iPhone cracking tech: the phone number of the vendor in both the purchase order and documents Motherboard previously obtained detailing a GrayKey purchase by Indiana State Police is the same. The "funding office" for the Grayshift purchase was the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, according to the procurement records. The Bureau acts as the law enforcement and security arm of the State Department, bearing "the core responsibility for providing a safe environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy," the State Department website reads.
On March 6, the State Department ordered an item from Grayshift for just over $15,000, according to a purchase order listing available on the U.S. government's public federal procurement data system. The listing is sparse on details, putting the order under the generic label of "computer and computer peripheral equipment." But Motherboard confirmed that the Grayshift in the State Department listing is the same as the one selling iPhone cracking tech: the phone number of the vendor in both the purchase order and documents Motherboard previously obtained detailing a GrayKey purchase by Indiana State Police is the same. The "funding office" for the Grayshift purchase was the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, according to the procurement records. The Bureau acts as the law enforcement and security arm of the State Department, bearing "the core responsibility for providing a safe environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy," the State Department website reads.
apple will just drop lightning cables in next phon (Score:3, Funny)
apple will just drop lightning cables in next phone
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Re:apple will just drop lightning cables in next p (Score:5, Funny)
Has to? HAS TO? Challenge Accepted!
--signed, Tim Cook.
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What and standardize on the USB-C connector that they helped popularize? Ironically, I really doubt it.
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Yes, but will they drop Fingerprint scanners? [slashdot.org]
And to think, the State Department could have saved $15,000 just by using a knife or a bullet to obtain a finger.
Re: Hope they got a warrant otherwise dmca violat (Score:1)
Silly peasant thinking those laws apply to police.
dmca does apply to police. (Score:2)
dmca does apply to police.
Strength of passcode? (Score:3, Insightful)
Re: Strength of passcode? (Score:3, Informative)
iOS allows indeterminant length pass phrases, you simply need to change a setting
Re:Strength of passcode? (Score:5, Informative)
What does it mean for a passcode to be particularly strong or weak when the passcode must be all digits and must be some fixed number of digits long?
It means that for the passcode to be stronger it needs to be longer. There is not a fixed number of digits, and the phone can be set to require you to tap OK after typing the passcode, so the number of digits cannot be determined.
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Does it randomize the position of the numbers on the screen, to prevent finger smudge attacks?
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Does it randomize the position of the numbers on the screen, to prevent finger smudge attacks?
Not that I'm aware of. But the phone screen is generally all smudged up, IMO. So seeing just prints over the relevant numbers is unlikely.
Re:Strength of passcode? (Score:4, Informative)
I take it you’re unaware that alphanumeric passcodes have been supported since iOS 4? In iOS 11, you just need to tap the rather obviously named Passcode Options button when you go to change your passcode to bring up the options for formats other than the six-digit default.
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I have an iPhone6+, running iOS11 and I cannot find anything called "passcode options" anywhere on my phone. The only thing that is even close to that is "passcode settings" in the guided access settings under accessibility, and that is a 6-digit password as well.
Could you tell me where, exactly, this option is supposed to be, because even the search function on my phone isn't finding anything like what you describe?
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Re:Strength of passcode? (Score:5, Informative)
Change your passcode.
On the "Enter your new passcode" screen, there is a link called "Passcode Options". Click that.
You then have three choices to choose from:
1). Custom Alphanumeric Code
2). Custom Numeric Code
3). 4-Digit Numeric Code
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Or, you know, I could be only human, and simply not have realized all these years where the option was. As it turns out, the only way to apparently set this feature on is to enable it when you specifically select the option to change the passcode on the device. As I rarely change my passcode, I had not noticed this facility until it was explicitly pointed out to me in a comment above.
But perish the notion that I am fallible, and that I wouldn't know something.... Clearly I have to be feigning ignora
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iPhone takes longer than a few hours to unlock, someone must be specifically hiding something! Guilty!
-FBI
Re:Strength of passcode? (Score:4, Interesting)
I've known people who've spent 10 to 15 minutes dealing with the security checkpoints simply because they had their device set to fingerprint unlock, even though they didn't have anything in particular on the phone that security would have been interested in.
That's why, about 30 minutes or so before I'm going through a security checkpoint where my belongings may be searched, I will unlock my phone so that it does not require any kind of password to turn on and navigate the home screen and applications. When they've asked to see the phone, I've simply handed it to them, they turned it on, saw that they had access to everything, and immediately handed it back without even trying to find anything or asking me any questions.
It seems that simply having a device that is locked at all gives them enough reason to want to search it, while having a device that is not leaves them giving the device back right away with no questions asked.
This also has the advantage that I will not be put in the position of even being asked for my password at all. Even though I may not legally have to tell them my passwords, I think that not cooperating with them, or even creating the appearance that I don't want to cooperate with them has some non-zero potential of making my life a whole lot more complicated than it needs to be, so unlocking the device beforehand so that it requires no such passcode avoids the matter entirely.
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You're lucky you're not a targeted person. We should all be constantly defending our right to privacy, along with our right to travel, so that those who actually have good reason to exercise them go as unnoticed as the next fellow.
Re:Strength of passcode? (Score:5, Insightful)
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WTF? Even if there ever was, there is no such requirement today. Mine has letters — and, wow, not all of them even from the Latin alphabet...
Another falsehood...
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Others mention the length, but also remember that the distribution of digits is not uniform for pass codes-- 0, 1, 2 have the highest rate of occurrence, so if you are brute forcing you emphasize those numbers more. There is a good probability that out of six digits no more than two are 4-9, after you exhaust common keyboard patterns.
Apple will buy one... (Score:5, Insightful)
...and then it will use it to determine how it is cracking the login, and then they will fix it, and the security will be even stronger for Apple. Sounds like a good deal. :P
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This tool isn't completely new. The fact that Apple didn't address the issue yet says that the security hole isn't that easy to deal with.
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...Or, it says that the company making the thing vets all potential customers to make sure that they don't torpedo their meal ticket by selling to a). criminal organizations, or b). security groups who would tattle to Apple.
Apple's probably going to have to figure this one out the old fashioned way.
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Apple's probably going to have to figure this one out the old fashioned way.
By buying it through a shell company?
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What about a security consulting and services company who performs electronic and physical pen-tests of US based data centers and R&D shops?
Do you think Apple could put one together (or find/purchase a controlling share in a private one)?
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Which is why it makes sense to order the $15000 limited use device rather than the more expensive unlimited device, even if you have more than 300 phones to unlock.
IOS or Security Enclave (Score:5, Interesting)
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Besides the Israeli and Russians who had it out years before. Service was easy in Thailand. A backdoor exploit must be non obvious. using the port not the screen is still obvious.Placing a logic analyzer in series with the connections is still obvious. It makes sense to impose a scramble box, then send to a 2nd iPhone. My bet is a memory dump occurs, and then is brute forced. And likely a 2nd round needed to find the salt, then a transformation. This would prevent simple replay attacks, and simple copycats.
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I thought you couldn't memory dump unless the phone unlocked to the device (as of recently, I think iOS10 or 11)?
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Verified? (Score:3)
Novice Question (Score:1)
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That's an interesting question. The front screen is just the first hurdle, depending on what they are trying to get to. For apps that use secondary authentication methods (fingerprint, facial scanning, DNA testing (just kidding, that doesn't come out for another couple years), etc) I don't know that they can get past that to get to say your financial institution. Would be interesting to find out if those can also be bypassed.
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Especially with physical access compromised.
State Department? Hmmm. (Score:3)
Why would the State Department be cracking phones? They provide neither a law enforcement nor an intelligence function.
Apple will likely NOT fix this problem. (Score:2)
Next Step... (Score:2)
So...do you suppose that Apple will just buy Grayshift next, and resolve the issue? And how long before they do the same with Cellebrite?
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Why buy the company when you can buy the device?
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Buy the device, you might not understand why it works. Buy the company, you buy the Intelectual Property, and maybe find an engineer in there who can make your products better before they roll out the door the first time.
What ever happened... (Score:2)
... to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act?
Can't the police, FBI and State Department be charged under the CFAA every time they use this device? "Oh, but we were doing it to serve the law!" is not an excuse otherwise White Hats would be immune from prosecution.