I mean, sure, it sounds bad, but are they banned from connecting to the Internet at all? The headline used "wireless modems" but I'm unclear if that means like cellular Internet or just WiFi. If the machines are networked together, even if in a local non-Internet connected wired network, that network already offers a possible intrusion point since by definition you have to allow outsiders physical access to the machines and the area voting is happening in.
The exact architecture varies by state, by my unders
Check out the Bluetooth vulns that get announced regularly. It doesn't have to be Internet connected to be vulnerable. Lest we forget, in order for voting machines to make any sense at all, it is necessary to grant "physical access" to them to a great many strangers. If there's a BT hack that can be escalated into some kind of app-level data corruption or other shenanigans, it would be easy for ${THREAT_ACTOR} to have all its supporters download its app, which oh by the way just so happens to scan for vulne
*EXACTLY*. Voting machines cease to be safe, or useful, the moment they stop being pure "box of paper that you can mark, indelibly, with a pen or punch". The point is that the only way a human voter can be sure that his or her vote is getting tallied the way he or she wanted to cast it, is if the entry process and the recording process (and hence the audit trail) are one and the same thing. The handoffs that happen inside a voting machine (screen to flash memory/hard disk, to printer) are not visible to the voter and can't be verified by him or her.
I challenge you to come up with a method of electronic voting that a *voter* can verify and trust at the time of casting the vote, and that can have an output audit record that is provably a record of the actual physical voting interactions made with it by the voters. If we assume that voting machines are vulnerable, then there is no way a voter can trust that "thing I saw on screen" == "thing transmitted as my vote", nor "thing stored as a verification record of my vote in case of future dispute".
I'm in Georgia. It's done like that, but the paper ballots are scanned on the spot (by different machines) so that the paper ballot and Dominion machines counts can be verified before the results are reported.
This is how the in-person voting (and early voting) goes in Georgia. We used Dominion voting machines in 2020 First, outside the polling place you show your ID into and fill out a paper sheet with your name, address, date and signature. It has some pre-printed location information. This is a paper reco
Interesting (and no I am not being snarky when I say that). What I'm not perceiving in this set of steps is: What did you gain by having the Dominion touchscreen machines at all? Unless I didn't follow, effectively what you have there is: Electronic vote entered into Dominion and tallied and sent to the central countinghouse, but also prints out a piece of paper the voter gets to hold, read and carry over to a second machine that scans the paper and stores the paper. Scanned result sent to central countingh
The percentage of rejected/spoiled hand-marked ballots is sometimes greater than the margin of victory in close races. This guarantees accusations of fraud. It's a huge problem with absentee ballots. Hand marked ballots places election officials in the postition of guessing the voter's intent, which is a bad thing if you don't trust the local officials.
Having the machine print the ballot eliminates spoiled ballots for such things as over-voting where the voter checks both Trump and Biden. That is more common
Hmm. But re: "thrown in the trash" - the voter doesn't get to keep a paper record in any of these systems (which is good). The FL system has electronic records in the scanned machine, and saves the paper copy. How is this riskier than the two-machines system you describe? In both cases, either the machine-of-record is networked, and sending its data realtime to the central counting office, or it is not networked - in which case, either someone throws away all the digital and paper ballots, or someone throws
Absentee ballots are on paper by definition, no? And so they essentially follow the FL model - scanned mark-sense cards, and the cards are stored for eyeballing later in case of dispute. Unless you create a system that lets people print their vote (sort of like a fillable PDF) the legibility issues are going to be unavoidable for absentee ballots.
Yes, but pretty much everyone in the U.S. has gotten pretty good at filling in little circles, ovals, or boxes to mark their selections. There are always a few edge cases that either have too light a marking or multiple markings. Those can always be diverted for manual review as you stated.
There are multiple states that use mail-in ballots for ALL elections - Hawai'i, Washington, Oregon, Utah, Colorado. They have already created methods for voter registration, change of address, in-person voting for mi
"Yes, but pretty much everyone in the U.S. has gotten pretty good at filling in little circles, ovals, or boxes to mark their selections. There are always a few edge cases that either have too light a marking or multiple markings. Those can always be diverted for manual review as you stated."
Yes, I should have said validity checking, or something of the kind. An earlier poster was mentioning "what happens if someone bubbles in a mark for every candidate" or the like.
When you make your mark in the world, watch out for guys with erasers.
-- The Wall Street Journal
Are they banned from Internet connections? (Score:3)
I mean, sure, it sounds bad, but are they banned from connecting to the Internet at all? The headline used "wireless modems" but I'm unclear if that means like cellular Internet or just WiFi. If the machines are networked together, even if in a local non-Internet connected wired network, that network already offers a possible intrusion point since by definition you have to allow outsiders physical access to the machines and the area voting is happening in.
The exact architecture varies by state, by my unders
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printing out a receipt after voting should be mandatory. That receipt is then placed in a sealed box so that the vote can be audited at a later date.
Re: Are they banned from Internet connections? (Score:2)
Then what vale is the voting machine beyond printing paper ballots?
Re: Are they banned from Internet connections? (Score:2)
I challenge you to come up with a method of electronic voting that a *voter* can verify and trust at the time of casting the vote, and that can have an output audit record that is provably a record of the actual physical voting interactions made with it by the voters. If we assume that voting machines are vulnerable, then there is no way a voter can trust that "thing I saw on screen" == "thing transmitted as my vote", nor "thing stored as a verification record of my vote in case of future dispute".
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I'm in Georgia. It's done like that, but the paper ballots are scanned on the spot (by different machines) so that the paper ballot and Dominion machines counts can be verified before the results are reported.
This is how the in-person voting (and early voting) goes in Georgia. We used Dominion voting machines in 2020
First, outside the polling place you show your ID into and fill out a paper sheet with your name, address, date and signature. It has some pre-printed location information. This is a paper reco
Re: (Score:2)
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The percentage of rejected/spoiled hand-marked ballots is sometimes greater than the margin of victory in close races. This guarantees accusations of fraud.
It's a huge problem with absentee ballots. Hand marked ballots places election officials in the postition of guessing the voter's intent, which is a bad thing if you don't trust the local officials.
Having the machine print the ballot eliminates spoiled ballots for such things as over-voting where the voter checks both Trump and Biden. That is more common
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
Absentee ballots are on paper by definition, no? And so they essentially follow the FL model - scanned mark-sense cards, and the cards are stored for eyeballing later in case of dispute. Unless you create a system that lets people print their vote (sort of like a fillable PDF) the legibility issues are going to be unavoidable for absentee ballots.
Yes, but pretty much everyone in the U.S. has gotten pretty good at filling in little circles, ovals, or boxes to mark their selections. There are always a few edge cases that either have too light a marking or multiple markings. Those can always be diverted for manual review as you stated.
There are multiple states that use mail-in ballots for ALL elections - Hawai'i, Washington, Oregon, Utah, Colorado. They have already created methods for voter registration, change of address, in-person voting for mi
Re: (Score:2)
Yes, I should have said validity checking, or something of the kind. An earlier poster was mentioning "what happens if someone bubbles in a mark for every candidate" or the like.