I mean, sure, it sounds bad, but are they banned from connecting to the Internet at all? The headline used "wireless modems" but I'm unclear if that means like cellular Internet or just WiFi. If the machines are networked together, even if in a local non-Internet connected wired network, that network already offers a possible intrusion point since by definition you have to allow outsiders physical access to the machines and the area voting is happening in.
The exact architecture varies by state, by my understanding is that for most voting machines, the current process is that the voting machines tabulate results onto removable media, that media is then loaded onto Internet-connected computers, which then uploads the final results to a server. Over the Internet.
So they're already effectively Internet-connected anyway.
Really we should just be using paper ballots, but for some reason, we've been sold on the idea that marking paper is "too complicated" and confusing for people to do.
Check out the Bluetooth vulns that get announced regularly. It doesn't have to be Internet connected to be vulnerable. Lest we forget, in order for voting machines to make any sense at all, it is necessary to grant "physical access" to them to a great many strangers. If there's a BT hack that can be escalated into some kind of app-level data corruption or other shenanigans, it would be easy for ${THREAT_ACTOR} to have all its supporters download its app, which oh by the way just so happens to scan for vulnerable BT devices and hack them. That's more traceable than a pocket-sized hardware wireless hack-o-tron of course, but anyway it illustrates that enabling networking is inherently dangerous when you can't observe/stop people from "plugging into" that network. There are only so many BT and WiFi stack vendors and all it takes is some eBay stalking to find out what exact version ${VOTING_MACHINE} happens to use.
The last sentence of the OP makes all the sense: Paper ballots that can be physically audited. Electronic tallying methods work invisibly and can never be above suspicion; they will be an endless source of conflict. Hanging chads are nothing compared to the ephemeral and untrustworthy nature of electronic vote recording. (Yes, blockchain. Never mind that).
That only works if the user is required to verify the printout (e.g. under a glass window) *after* the paper is marked, but *before* the vote is recorded/approved. Otherwise the same hack can pretend to show truth onscreen, but silently change all transmitted and tabulated votes to "Vermin Supreme".
*EXACTLY*. Voting machines cease to be safe, or useful, the moment they stop being pure "box of paper that you can mark, indelibly, with a pen or punch". The point is that the only way a human voter can be sure that his or her vote is getting tallied the way he or she wanted to cast it, is if the entry process and the recording process (and hence the audit trail) are one and the same thing. The handoffs that happen inside a voting machine (screen to flash memory/hard disk, to printer) are not visible to the
I'm in Georgia. It's done like that, but the paper ballots are scanned on the spot (by different machines) so that the paper ballot and Dominion machines counts can be verified before the results are reported.
This is how the in-person voting (and early voting) goes in Georgia. We used Dominion voting machines in 2020 First, outside the polling place you show your ID into and fill out a paper sheet with your name, address, date and signature. It has some pre-printed location information. This is a paper reco
Interesting (and no I am not being snarky when I say that). What I'm not perceiving in this set of steps is: What did you gain by having the Dominion touchscreen machines at all? Unless I didn't follow, effectively what you have there is: Electronic vote entered into Dominion and tallied and sent to the central countinghouse, but also prints out a piece of paper the voter gets to hold, read and carry over to a second machine that scans the paper and stores the paper. Scanned result sent to central countingh
The percentage of rejected/spoiled hand-marked ballots is sometimes greater than the margin of victory in close races. This guarantees accusations of fraud. It's a huge problem with absentee ballots. Hand marked ballots places election officials in the postition of guessing the voter's intent, which is a bad thing if you don't trust the local officials.
Having the machine print the ballot eliminates spoiled ballots for such things as over-voting where the voter checks both Trump and Biden. That is more common
Hmm. But re: "thrown in the trash" - the voter doesn't get to keep a paper record in any of these systems (which is good). The FL system has electronic records in the scanned machine, and saves the paper copy. How is this riskier than the two-machines system you describe? In both cases, either the machine-of-record is networked, and sending its data realtime to the central counting office, or it is not networked - in which case, either someone throws away all the digital and paper ballots, or someone throws
Absentee ballots are on paper by definition, no? And so they essentially follow the FL model - scanned mark-sense cards, and the cards are stored for eyeballing later in case of dispute. Unless you create a system that lets people print their vote (sort of like a fillable PDF) the legibility issues are going to be unavoidable for absentee ballots.
Yes, but pretty much everyone in the U.S. has gotten pretty good at filling in little circles, ovals, or boxes to mark their selections. There are always a few edge cases that either have too light a marking or multiple markings. Those can always be diverted for manual review as you stated.
There are multiple states that use mail-in ballots for ALL elections - Hawai'i, Washington, Oregon, Utah, Colorado. They have already created methods for voter registration, change of address, in-person voting for mi
"Yes, but pretty much everyone in the U.S. has gotten pretty good at filling in little circles, ovals, or boxes to mark their selections. There are always a few edge cases that either have too light a marking or multiple markings. Those can always be diverted for manual review as you stated."
Yes, I should have said validity checking, or something of the kind. An earlier poster was mentioning "what happens if someone bubbles in a mark for every candidate" or the like.
Then what vale is the voting machine beyond printing paper ballots?
Eliminating "hanging chads" and making it so that they do not have to print a separate ballot for each town in the state (which is what NY does around me, each polling place gets a different ballot (as it has town, county, state and national races on it)).
As I understand it, this is exactly what happens with the Dominion system. A "paper ballot receipt" is generated when a vote is scanned. What happens next is not too clear. Does it stay on a roll of thermal paper? Does it get shuffled into a locked bin? Does the voter have a opportunity to look at it to verify their choices? *shrugs* When they say they did a hand recount in Georgia, the recount was in fact of the paper receipts generated by the Dominion machines, not of the original paper ballots. The Georgia
Just because marking paper ballots worked for over two hundred years doesn't mean it isn't too complicated or confusing to work! Other than literally that is.
But twenty years ago it wasn't racist, oppressive, unfair or anti-democratic to go to a polling place on a specific Tuesday, now we're supposed to agree that it is. Before the automobile, people who needed to spend most of their time tending fields so the nation didn't starve managed to go all the way to a polling place to cast a paper ballot, now
When you make your mark in the world, watch out for guys with erasers.
-- The Wall Street Journal
Are they banned from Internet connections? (Score:3)
I mean, sure, it sounds bad, but are they banned from connecting to the Internet at all? The headline used "wireless modems" but I'm unclear if that means like cellular Internet or just WiFi. If the machines are networked together, even if in a local non-Internet connected wired network, that network already offers a possible intrusion point since by definition you have to allow outsiders physical access to the machines and the area voting is happening in.
The exact architecture varies by state, by my understanding is that for most voting machines, the current process is that the voting machines tabulate results onto removable media, that media is then loaded onto Internet-connected computers, which then uploads the final results to a server. Over the Internet.
So they're already effectively Internet-connected anyway.
Really we should just be using paper ballots, but for some reason, we've been sold on the idea that marking paper is "too complicated" and confusing for people to do.
Re: (Score:2)
The dipshits making this stuff can't figure out basic concepts like end-to-end encryption or VPNs.
Because it's well known that malware distributed using encryption isn't malware, and if you distribute malware over a VPN it won't work.
and nobody has ever figured out how to turn off encryption.
(uh, in case that isn't obvious: that was sarcasm).
Re:Are they banned from Internet connections? (Score:5, Insightful)
The last sentence of the OP makes all the sense: Paper ballots that can be physically audited. Electronic tallying methods work invisibly and can never be above suspicion; they will be an endless source of conflict. Hanging chads are nothing compared to the ephemeral and untrustworthy nature of electronic vote recording. (Yes, blockchain. Never mind that).
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printing out a receipt after voting should be mandatory. That receipt is then placed in a sealed box so that the vote can be audited at a later date.
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Re: Are they banned from Internet connections? (Score:2)
Then what vale is the voting machine beyond printing paper ballots?
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I'm in Georgia. It's done like that, but the paper ballots are scanned on the spot (by different machines) so that the paper ballot and Dominion machines counts can be verified before the results are reported.
This is how the in-person voting (and early voting) goes in Georgia. We used Dominion voting machines in 2020
First, outside the polling place you show your ID into and fill out a paper sheet with your name, address, date and signature. It has some pre-printed location information. This is a paper reco
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
The percentage of rejected/spoiled hand-marked ballots is sometimes greater than the margin of victory in close races. This guarantees accusations of fraud.
It's a huge problem with absentee ballots. Hand marked ballots places election officials in the postition of guessing the voter's intent, which is a bad thing if you don't trust the local officials.
Having the machine print the ballot eliminates spoiled ballots for such things as over-voting where the voter checks both Trump and Biden. That is more common
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Re: (Score:2)
Absentee ballots are on paper by definition, no? And so they essentially follow the FL model - scanned mark-sense cards, and the cards are stored for eyeballing later in case of dispute. Unless you create a system that lets people print their vote (sort of like a fillable PDF) the legibility issues are going to be unavoidable for absentee ballots.
Yes, but pretty much everyone in the U.S. has gotten pretty good at filling in little circles, ovals, or boxes to mark their selections. There are always a few edge cases that either have too light a marking or multiple markings. Those can always be diverted for manual review as you stated.
There are multiple states that use mail-in ballots for ALL elections - Hawai'i, Washington, Oregon, Utah, Colorado. They have already created methods for voter registration, change of address, in-person voting for mi
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Yes, I should have said validity checking, or something of the kind. An earlier poster was mentioning "what happens if someone bubbles in a mark for every candidate" or the like.
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Then what vale is the voting machine beyond printing paper ballots?
Eliminating "hanging chads" and making it so that they do not have to print a separate ballot for each town in the state (which is what NY does around me, each polling place gets a different ballot (as it has town, county, state and national races on it)).
Aaron Z
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As I understand it, this is exactly what happens with the Dominion system. A "paper ballot receipt" is generated when a vote is scanned. What happens next is not too clear. Does it stay on a roll of thermal paper? Does it get shuffled into a locked bin? Does the voter have a opportunity to look at it to verify their choices?
*shrugs*
When they say they did a hand recount in Georgia, the recount was in fact of the paper receipts generated by the Dominion machines, not of the original paper ballots. The Georgia
Re: (Score:2)
But twenty years ago it wasn't racist, oppressive, unfair or anti-democratic to go to a polling place on a specific Tuesday, now we're supposed to agree that it is. Before the automobile, people who needed to spend most of their time tending fields so the nation didn't starve managed to go all the way to a polling place to cast a paper ballot, now