Apple Can Extract Texts, Photos, Contacts From Locked iPhones 202
Trailrunner7 (1100399) writes "If law enforcement gets hold of your locked iPhone and has some interest in its contents, Apple can pull all kinds of content from the device, including texts, contacts, photos and videos, call history and audio recordings. The company said in a new document that provides guidance for law enforcement agencies on the kinds of information Apple can provide and what methods can be used to obtain it that if served with a search warrant, officials will help law enforcement agents extract specific application-specific data from a locked iOS device. However, that data appears to be limited to information related to Apple apps, such as iMessage, the contacts and the camera. Email contents and calendar data can't be extracted, the company said in the guidelines."
So... cloud access? (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:So... cloud access? (Score:4, Informative)
Re:So... cloud access? (Score:5, Informative)
Apparently not. It sounds like they're limited to whatever applications are currently running though:
Upon receipt of a valid search warrant, Apple can extract certain categories of active data from passcode locked iOS devices. Specifically, the user generated active files on an iOS device that are contained in Apple’s native apps and for which the data is not encrypted using the passcode (“user generated active files”), can be extracted and provided to law enforcement on external media. Apple can perform this data extraction process on iOS devices running iOS 4 or more recent versions of iOS. Please note the only categories of user generated active files that can be provided to law enforcement, pursuant to a valid search warrant, are: SMS, photos, videos, contacts, audio recording, and call history. Apple cannot provide: email, calendar entries, or any third-party App data.
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So what exactly constitutes a "user generated active file"? Some kind of temp file kept open as long as an app is "open"? And what does "open" mean, really? Shows up when you double-click the home button? Many of those apps aren't really running, if you switch to them most seem to revert to cold-start behavior.
It makes me wonder if there's a paranoia step a person could take before entering a known security zone, like force-quitting the native apps in question, or whether powering the device off does th
Re:So... cloud access? (Score:5, Insightful)
So what exactly constitutes a "user generated active file"? Some kind of temp file kept open as long as an app is "open"? And what does "open" mean, really?
Look at the source code and see. Oh, right. Never mind, it's proprietary and thus 4200% fucked.
Add this question to your list: How do you even trust them to be telling the truth with national security gag letters now standard?
Re:So... cloud access? (Score:5, Informative)
Look at the source code and see.
Even if I had the source code, it wouldn't do me personally any good as I couldn't grok what it did just from reading it. It would do me as much good as it did 99.99% of OpenSSL users.
Gag letters prohibit what they can say, they don't require them to make false statements of fact. You might make the argument that they could in fact be strong-armed through some extralegal method of making false statements of fact to engender false confidence in potential targets of spying, but that's getting a little into tinfoil hat territory.
In fact, I think an Apple statement of what little they can extract is pretty good and serves as a kind of interesting statement on what they believe is recoverable. It doesn't include third-party techniques or equipment that you might find in an NSA laboratory, but I don't know that Apple makes that kind of penetration test of their own devices.
Re:So... cloud access? (Score:4, Insightful)
It would do me as much good as it did 99.99% of OpenSSL users.
Actually 100% of OpenSSL users, for several years.
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The appropriate paranoid step is enabling encryption. Then, turn off your phone if you suspect it may be taken from you.
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I've had encryption enabled since it became available.
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Or, smash it. Apple specifically states that the phone must be in good working condition for them to do shit.
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They mean functional. If you break the screen, they may still do it. Drop it in some water, though, and it may be hosed enough for them to not bother. (Really, the "in good working condition" statement is there for one purpose: it says that they won't go to any extreme measures to make it work. They have a process in place for doing this, and if it's successful, they'll give you the data; if it's not, they're not doing experimental forensics for you.)
I was thinking more of something you could do to secure y
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So what exactly constitutes a "user generated active file"?
From the document: "Please note the only categories of user generated active files that can be provided to law enforcement, pursuant to a valid search warrant, are: SMS, photos, videos, contacts, audio recording, and call history. Apple cannot provide: email, calendar entries, or any third-party App data."
It's things that no phone tends to encrypt.
Re:So... cloud access? (Score:5, Interesting)
If you read Apple's document [apple.com], they make it pretty clear in Section I that they're talking about extracting data from an iOS 4 or later iOS device that is passcode locked and in good working order. Besides which, not all of that data goes through iCloud (e.g. call history, audio recordings (unless you're backing them up), etc.).
Moreover, they've detailed the security of their iCloud offerings before, and what I noticed immediately is that while SMS texts can be extracted according to this document, iMessages are not listed, suggesting this isn't just an iCloud backdoor. Likewise, if they were able to access your iCloud stuff, they'd have access to a whole lot more, such as calendar events, e-mails, and any third-party data you had backed up using iCloud Backup.
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Likewise, if they were able to access your iCloud stuff, they'd have access to a whole lot more, such as calendar events, e-mails, and any third-party data you had backed up using iCloud Backup.
From the source you linked:
iii. Email Content
iCloud only stores the email a user has elected to maintain in the account while the customer’s account remains active. Apple is unable to produce deleted content. Apple will produce customer content, as it exists in the customer’s mailbox in response to a search warrant.
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iv. Other iCloud Content. PhotoStream, Docs, Contacts, Calendars, Bookmarks, iOS Device Backups
iCloud only stores the content for these services that the customer has elected to maintain in the account while the customer’s account remains active. Apple does not retain deleted content once it is cleared from Apple’s servers. Apple will produce customer content in these categories only in response to a valid search warrant.
Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection (Score:3)
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Keychain's encrypted. So I'm guessing no, but it could be back doored.
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Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection (Score:5, Interesting)
Wouldn't law enforcement just require the account usernames and then get the data from the respective service providers with a warrant? Sounds a bit unprofessional that they would go logging in to the accounts by themselves.
You've never been in court have you?
The primary legal argument in most cases in this country are: "Well we're the police we can do that. Constitution? Sure you could appeal this but the fines $500, you're legal fees on appeal would be at least $5000... tell you what, pay the fine and we expunge the charges in 6 months!"
Yes, this has happened to me. I even got a ticket once for "unlawful use of horn" when I honked at a guy that almost hit me. But he was the cops uncle (cop told me this) he then proceeded to tell me "Sure this would get thrown out of court, but I get paid to go to court. You don't. I can give you a ticket every day you drive through here. How long would you keep your job? Now how about you stop being a jerk and honking at old people?" I called the police station later and spoke with the guys boss who laughed at me and said his officer told him "Some jerk will be calling you..."
The police only follow proper procedure and what-not when they think the case is big enough that it'll mater... i.e. you're going to jail and they know you'll fight tooth and nail. Otherwise they just search illegally, bully and batter people, contaminate evidence (if they even bother to collect any) and then slap a fine on you. If the fines aren't over a couple of thousand and there's no jail involved, its almost always in your financial best interest to just roll over and take it. In the few cases where the person doesn't? They don't care, 100 other people got arrested on the same day.
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I don't have as much issue with this kind of police state antics as some other things because these kind of communications just don't seem to have as much expatiation of privacy. Lik
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They require the phone to be shipped to Cupertino, in good working order. So I'm guessing that if you execute a remote wipe (which, on an encrypted iPhone constitutes the disk controller basically forgetting the encryption key), that law enforcement is fucked. And, because we're not talking about a magnetic medium, there's very little forensic recovery possible.
Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection (Score:5, Interesting)
How about google, hotmail, facebook etc passwords from Safari's settings? Thats what law enforcement always look for. That is cop gold right there.
No, that is prosecutor cyanide. Cops do not generally log in with the user's credentials, because it poisons the evidence gained from that site. Any competent defense attorney could get the subsequent evidence found that way thrown out almost immediately ("So, officer, you logged in as the user and acted on his behalf in the website? How do we know that you and your cohorts didn't plant the evidence yourself? Tainted evidence, yerhonor!")
Easier to get a warrant, have the provider give you the data. That way you can have a valid chain of custody, proof that there was no impersonation by cops or prosecutor, and absolutely no chance of any claims being valid that questions the veracity and integrity of the evidence found. Hell, even in those few cases where a user/pass is used, both prosecution and defense attorneys are present during its use (and depending on locate, a clerk of the court) - the defense (and clerk) are there to keep 'em honest.
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("So, officer, you logged in as the user and acted on his behalf in the website? How do we know that you and your cohorts didn't plant the evidence yourself? Tainted evidence, yerhonor!")
Yet...
"So, officer, you opened the defendants trunk and 'found' drugs there? How do we know that you and your cohorts didn't plant the evidence yourself? Tainted evidence, yerhonor!"
Doesn't seem to be a get out of jail free card for people getting pulled over and having their vehicle searched.
Hell, even if the police get a
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How about google, hotmail, facebook etc passwords from Safari's settings?
No, they can't extract those.
Who gives a crap about the data in the calendar app, thats all hosted on apples cloud anyway.
Well it might be. If the user chose to set up an iCloud account, and hasn't deleted the data since. In every other case it's unavailable. It can't be extracted from the phone.
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Or in the Enterprise, the calendar data is stored on MY servers. MY caldav, MY carddav, MY imap server.
People who care about security don't use someone else's servers to store their important data.
Another "threat post" blog entry. (Score:5, Insightful)
How much is threat post paying timothy to drive up their traffic with these half ass stories?
The summary fails to mention that the phone must be in their possession and the both the phone and the search warrant must be delivered to Apple's headquarters which is the only place Apple will perform the extraction.
If anything I applaud Apple for both publicly disclosing their policy for dealing with law enforcement and requiring a search warrant with more detail than "suspect's phone". They require the model number, phone number, serial of IEMI number and FCC ID number.
Maybe not anyone (Score:3, Informative)
At least not trivial task. Per the iOS Security white paper:
"The device’s unique ID (UID) and a device group ID (GID) are AES 256-bit keys fused into the application processor during manufacturing. No software or firmware can read them directly; they can see only the results of encryption or decryption opera- tions performed using them. The UID is unique to each device and is not recorded by Apple or any of its suppliers. The GID is common to all processors in a class of devices (for example, all devi
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But you'd have to prod that data to pass that line though. That's probably why they can only access the data that is basically already visible through the locked front screen (messages, photos).
Either way, if my phone were confiscated for whatever reason, the first thing that would happen is a remote wipe - basically a deadman's switch, if my phone doesn't check into a server every 12 hours, it wipes. Backups are also encrypted and can be restored in less than 5 minutes (there is no data locally that isn't
Pro Tip: (Score:2)
Re:Pro Tip: (Score:4, Insightful)
Got Root?
If the answer was ever anything other than "Yes" then you don't own shit.
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Are you saying I don't really own my (Linux powered) Garmin GPS and my Nintendo Wii? They sure seem like mine. If I sell them I get the money.
Or is this one of those Stallman "political correctness" things?
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iMessage? (Score:4, Informative)
"iMessage" is a message transport. The app is "Messages". The document from Apple specifically says "SMS": it does not mention either Messages or iMessage. While it's possible that Apple leaves iMessages unencrypted on the device, it would be surprising given how much trouble they go through to protect then in transit. So while this document doesn't explicitly say iMessages are safe, it also doesn't say they're vulnerable.
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You;re right. The only mention in the document of either "iMessages" or "messages" is:
"Apple cannot intercept usersâ(TM) iMessage or FaceTime communications as these communications are end-to-end encrypted."
As this is a document saying what Apple CAN get with a warrant, clearly iMessages can't be.
The actual article (Score:5, Informative)
Hey, let's link to the actual document in question! What a novel concept!
http://www.apple.com/legal/mor... [apple.com]
Good news:
- Apple cannot track a phone via GPS, nor forcibly enable Find My Friends/Find my iPhone
- Apple cannot monitor FaceTime or iMessage conversations since they are end-to-end encrypted
- Apple cannot provide third-party app data that is encrypted since the files are encrypted with the user's passcode.
- It appears if the user does a remote wipe before law enforcement can get a warrant and ship the phone to Apple (or fly it there), then there is nothing that can be done. I wonder if they power up the device in an anechoic chamber so it can't receive the remote wipe signal? I would guess no because most people aren't smart enough to do an immediate wipe.
- We already knew the only trick they have as far as encrypted files goes is a custom firmware that bypasses the max attempt auto-erase and rate limit feature, so it can attempt to brute-force passcodes quickly. However it requires the attempt be made on-device, since the keys are stored in the secure storage with no facility to get them off-device. So even a moderately complex passcode is effectively unbreakable, let alone a good strong password.
Questionable:
- user generated active files (this is what SMS/call logs/photos/etc are listed under). Normally if a device is powered off and rebooted, I was under the impression that these things were not available because the files are encrypted. It seems that iMessage is at least encrypted here, but I would be curious to find out what the situation is. Everything except photos, videos, and recordings is a moot point because you can get stuff like SMS history and call logs from the carrier anyway so those are the only ones I'd be concerned about.
There are some definite good points here - Apple has chosen not to build themselves backdoors or workarounds, presumably because they can't be ordered to disclose information they don't have access to... same reason they built iMessage the way they did. A court would have to order them to refactor their software before it could order them to intercept messages, and at least in the US there is no precedent or law that can compel them to do so.
However I would expect the âoeuser generated active filesâ to be encrypted after a device reboot until the passcode is entered. If that is not the case, Apple should fix it pronto.
I would also expect Apple to refactor the storage of those things to be segmented, given the NSA revelations and increasingly authoritarian behavior of law enforcement; for example, photos pending background upload could be kept unencrypted, but once uploaded they should be rewritten as encrypted so they require the passcode to access. They already have the ephemeral key tech and per-file key support so you can generate a key for the unencrypted file while the device is unlocked, then toss the passcode key when the device locks and only hold onto the file key until the upload is finished, then toss it. Thus no risk to the main key but you can still encrypt the file in the background.
I won't bother discussing Android phones - they are almost all trivial to break and access all the user's data, when people like Samsung aren't coding back doors directly into the firmware.
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if the user does a remote wipe
I do not claim to know details... but as you mentioned a remote wipe won't work on a phone that is powered off and there are things known as Faraday Cage that should block signals once the time to power on the device and take evidence off it arrives.
Surprised? (Score:2)
If at this point people are still surprised that this is possible then they are just naïve. Privacy in public forums (internet being the biggest forum of all) is not possible in this current age. Other than my personal information I don't care what people know or get from me. Some people have a dark past and don't want information to leak but I honestly have nothing to hide so I don't care.
Think of it this way: We are all Truman in the Truman show. The public is watching and so are the officials. Crook
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No, think of it this way: You don't understand what is and is not a "public forum". The "texts, contacts, photos and videos, call history and audio recordings" stored on your personal phone are not accessible in a "public forum", and Apple is somehow (allegedly) pulling these things from your device remotely (heaven knows why the security model even allows this to happen) at the behest of law enforcement.
Other than my personal information I don't care what people know or get from me.
What if people knew you were an idiot? Congrats, you just displayed it in a public forum.
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No, think of it this way: You don't understand what is and is not a "public forum". The "texts, contacts, photos and videos, call history and audio recordings" stored on your personal phone are not accessible in a "public forum", and Apple is somehow (allegedly) pulling these things from your device remotely (heaven knows why the security model even allows this to happen) at the behest of law enforcement.
The whole thing and how it works has been well-documented for a long time.
First, an iOS device's flash storage is always encrypted. The encryption is basically unbreakable. But obviously, the iPhone can still read it. That's because you enter your passcode, and that passcode is used to unlock the data.
The bit of code where you enter your passcode is written and signed by Apple. Only code that is cryptographically signed by Apple is capable of checking a passcode and with the right passcode giving acce
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Not remotely, unless your definition has changed to "using some other computer hooked up to it".
Apple needs to be in physical possession of the suspect device, AND said device needs to be delivered with warrant simultaneously.
Likely this means the phone needs to be hooked up to a special test rig to actually work.
Older iPhones and other
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Except that they aren't pulling that stuff remotely, as their policy requires the device be sent to Cupertino in good working condition.
Doesn't sound very remote to me.
EaseUS Mobisaver Freecan download that stuff...Duh (Score:4, Interesting)
I just did this on a locked iPhone i Found Yesterday to try to identify the owner.
It was locked from too many bad PIN's entered and I was able to access Photos, Call Log, TXT Messages, etc.
Didn't give me access to every single thing on the phone, but that is still a lot considering this is a shareware limited app anyone can download.
There are more advanced Forensic programs that are available, but they can get more pricey.
But if anyone with google can find a shareware app, what hope to you have against the government with all their money and resources.
http://www.easeus.com/mobile-t... [easeus.com]
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what hope to you have against the government with all their money and resources.
Given that the App you mention and Apple's list of what they can extract amount to the same thing, it's probable the government also can access the same things. Basically anything that not encrypted on the device or backup can be accessed by all (with physical access). Things that are encrypted can't be. Even by people working for scary 3 letter acronyms.
Even though apple phones have encrypted files... (Score:3)
I had someone give me an iphone 4 last year where a child playing with the phone had accidentally deleted all the pictures. My task was to recover all the deleted pictures. It took me a few hours, mainly because I had never done anything with an iphone before. The process that worked invovled booting the phone with a different bootloader and breaking the encryption key. Most of the information and software to accomplish this can be found with a few minutes of searching.
And so can just about everyone else (Score:2)
See http://www.cellebrite.com/mobile-forensics. Every Apple store has Cellebrite phone forensics software and so do a every police agency who can afford it.
The official documentation (Score:2)
I posted this elsewhere in the thread, but this describes the iOS security mechanisms in excruciating detail, including the full-disk encryption, etc. etc. Note that it does vary by hardware platform (3GS, 4, 4S, 5, 5S) and iOS version, so this is the "new hotness". There's a lot of incorrect information in the comments.
http://images.apple.com/ipad/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb14.pdf
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So, let me understand your point better. You're saying that you believe what Apple publishes on its own security mechanism?
Don't you?
Remember, we are Apple's customers. We are the people paying Apple. How much money do you think does Apple make by supporting law enforcement? I'd say $0 if they are lucky, but quite possibly a loss. What interest does Apple have in reading your data or making it available to someone? Apple's biggest source of profit is selling phones, followed by selling tablets, followed by selling computers. Just like Google, Apple's interested in keeping their customers happy so they keep paying money. Unli
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There's a built in file manager for the iphone?
Weird... Had no idea...
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https://support.apple.com/kb/h... [apple.com]
If passcode-protected whole phone encryption is enabled, no one should be able to access that without the key. I guess they know how it works more than I do. They've even redefined encryption. It's "encrypted" just like everything else these days. I guess it's still technically encrypted even if everyone has a key.
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All phones probably use the same salt so it's a backdoor it also means that someone out there will find that backdoor.
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in other news, apple will begin notifying users of supoena requests LINK [macrumors.com]
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Any entity with the private keys control what happens with the data on the device.
Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works. (Score:5, Informative)
They don't supply shit to law enforcement - their policy [apple.com] says that the device has to be shipped to Cupertino in good working order, where they will do the data extraction only with a proper search warrant or court order. The data is then provided on optical media:
Specifically, the user generated active files on an iOS device that are contained in Apple’s native apps and for which the data is not encrypted using the passcode (“user generated active files”), can be extracted and provided to law enforcement on external media. Apple can perform this data extraction process on iOS devices running iOS 4 or more recent versions of iOS. Please note the only categories of user generated active files that can be provided to law enforcement, pursuant to a valid search warrant, are: SMS, photos, videos, contacts, audio recording, and call history. Apple cannot provide: email, calendar entries, or any third-party App data.
See section I of the linked document, entitled "Extracting Data from Passcode Locked iOS Devices".
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All phones probably use the same salt so it's a backdoor it also means that someone out there will find that backdoor.
The lack of thought... What happens when the passcode screen comes up and you type in your passcode 1234? The software takes your passcode, 1234, and no other input that isn't directly available to the passcode software, and unlocks your phone. A police officer taking your locked phone takes five seconds to type a passcode, and your phone gets erased after ten attempts, because that's what Apple's passcode software does.
Apple can replace the passcode software. (Nobody else can, because only software code
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Using the same salt doesn't change anything.
In order for the salt to be useful, it can't be stored encrypted anyway, so they don't need to use the same salt, it would be very easy to read.
The system has to be able to read the salt in order to combine it with your password to make the actual key or password hash or whatever.
Same salt is the same as no salt, it doesn't provide a back door.
Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works. (Score:5, Informative)
https://support.apple.com/kb/h... [apple.com]
If passcode-protected whole phone encryption is enabled, no one should be able to access that without the key. I guess they know how it works more than I do. They've even redefined encryption. It's "encrypted" just like everything else these days. I guess it's still technically encrypted even if everyone has a key.
Not everything is encrypted. According to the guidelines:
Specifically, the user generated active files on an iOS device that are contained in Apple’s native apps and for which the data is not encrypted using the passcode (“user generated active files”), can be extracted and provided to law enforcement on external media.
So, data can only be extracted if it is not encrypted. Sounds reasonable. Of course it would be better if everything was encrypted.
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Every iOS device has a dedicated AES 256-bit crypto engine built in that is used to encrypt all data on the device at all times. In addition, the iOS Cryptographic Modules have been granted FIPS 140-2 compliance by the U.S. federal government on devices running iOS 6.
Emphasis mine. Sounds like doublespeak to me.
Re: alt: guys who built iphone know how it works. (Score:2)
Encrypted by the hardware encryption key that's physically on the device.
Some data is encrypted by hardware encryption and pass code.
Some data is encrypted by just the hardware.
That's why Apple requires the entire phone. Just an image of the device is not enough. They've got to lift the actual encryption key off of the hardware.
Still a little double speak, but not too much. They're saying everything is encrypted, but not necessarily by the PIN.
Most IT departments see this as reasonable encryption, as gettin
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MS on the other hand, really don't know how to build a filemanager for their phone, so they gave up.
I'm honestly surprised when someone on MSDN knows the precise reason something works or does not, their own code probably looks like muck to them, too. Keep going through these exercises of "try this..."
OT - I'm not surprised. Is anyone surprise? Apple is the private sector equivalent to the NSA.
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The news is the Apple has received enough LEA requests for information that they've put together guidelines as a pre-emptive against being bothered about things they can't do.
I suppose we could be heartened that it specifically states upon receiving a warrant thus-and-such are available? Until a three-letter agency gives them a Sekrit Not-A-Warrant Order requiring the information. And that, Government, is the whirlwind you reap when you play fast and loose with the Constitution - there should be no trus
Re:News? (Score:4, Insightful)
The page states that they can only access information which is not encrypted, and is "active", whatever that means. Reading between the lines, it seems they can get at information that's currently in RAM.
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To my knowledge, Apple doesn't do RAM access. Some law-enforcement forensic analysts might, but I don't know of iOS RAM-capture tools that actually work. The whole field is poorly-understood.
"Active" here almost certainly means "not deleted". LE analysts usually ask if you can access deleted data.
The story here is that Apple can unlock and access the files on an unencrypted iPhone. That shouldn't come as a surprise to anyone. You can do that without Apple's help, and you can do it to unencrypted Android pho
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You should look up JTAG, the whole field is fairly well understood to any hardware developer on the planet, its not even all that complex.
To think Apple has no JTAG support on their devices is just silly and shows a lack of understanding the hardware development process.
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I haven't actually disassembled an iPhone to see if it has an exposed JTAG header. I've connected to a lot of other consumer devices with JTAG, though. It's extremely common to disable JTAG entirely on the devices that are sold to consumers (though the header and traces are still there, they just don't do anything). Most devices where it does work only talk on JTAG if the device powers up with something connected to the header -- which eliminates using it for RAM access for forensic purposes. Lots of densel
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If there were a master key, they would be able to get the whole system and also, it would be trivial for someone to find/leak that key and every single device would be at risk. Also, having encryption with 2 simultaneous private keys is impossible if you don't have access to both keys at time of encryption (and hardcoding a key in software would defeat the purpose of the encryption all-together). The device self-destructs when attempting brute forces so that's not it either. I'd say they can access 'some' d
Comment removed (Score:4, Informative)
Seconded. Mod non-A/C parent up. (Score:2)
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Here is the fart you requested.
http://images.apple.com/ipad/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb14.pdf
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So, about that geek card... ;-)
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Raise your hand if you thought the iPhone contains some magical Steve Jobs fart that would prevent someone with hardware access (leave alone Apple with hardware access!) from ripping the unencryped data (which, in a default setup, is essentially everything except your e-mail) from the flash chips.
*RAISES HAND*
From iOS 4 onwards, all disk data is encrypted if you have set a passcode. Hardware access to the flash chips won't help you.
And the only people that don't set a passcode are people that don't care about security. Without a passcode Law enforcement don't need Apple's help. They just open the app and read the data.
And yes, hardware access is necessary even if it isn't explicilty stated in the summary. Anyhow, those that did raise their hands earlier, please hand in your geek card and don't let the door hit you in the ass on the way out.
Either you are badly misstating what you believe, or you already lost your geek card.
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Hmm. We're both right in a way. This is why I said about maybe you were misstating what you believe.
All files are encrypted. You know what a remote disk wipe does on iOS? It deletes the encryption key(s), nothing more. It doesn't delete the data. It doesn't have to because without keys, the data might as well be random bits.
What's causing you to be mistaken is there are different categories of file protection on different files. One is called "No Protection", but it isn't no encryption.
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Blackberry's BBM message facility is the most secure in the business. Which is why Blackberry's are the criminal's first choice of phone. I'm not just saying that, the London looting "riots" of a few years ago were organised by criminal gangs and they used BBM to do it.
Apple's pretty secure though. If you want to see a real sham, look to Android - remove the SSD from most Androids, and you have all the user data right there, unencrypted. Users have to take active steps to encrypt stuff. And how many do that
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Blackberry... wasn't that the company that sends all your mail and everything you ever communicate through their servers?
You don't understand how blackberries work.
Yes, they send your data though their servers, in the same way that your data goes through your cell phone company.
BUT, with a blackberry enterprise server, Blackberry does NOT have the decryption keys. That is the relevant point - even if Blackberry wants to hand over information to law enforcement, Blackberry isn't able to decrypt the data.
Blac
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Wasn't there a story a couple of years ago that Blackberry DID have backdoors to both BES and their own system and shared it with not just US but also Indian and other governments around the world.
Neither Blackberry nor any other corporation is to be trusted, as long as your security is closed source or you have no control over it, it is to be seen as compromised. Use open source security on your OWN systems, that's the only way to be halfway sure that there are no immediate backdoors.
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Wasn't there a story a couple of years ago that Blackberry DID have backdoors to both BES and their own system and shared it with not just US but also Indian and other governments around the world.
That was BIS not BES. BES you run yourself, BIS is run on Blackberry's own servers.
Enterprise customers will remain safe from India’s spooks after BlackBerry presumably persuaded the authorities that it doesn’t have – and indeed never did have – the BES encryption keys for individual corporates to hand over.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/07/11/blackberry_gives_indian_spooks_access/ [theregister.co.uk]
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It's been known for a while that their "Filevault" has a corporate key (allegedly for employees but wouldn't it work for anyone?) to unlock it.
Oh my god. When you turn Filevault on, it displays a 20 digit hex string which you can write on a piece of paper, hide in your cupboard, and use to decrypt the hard drive if you forgot the password. Alternatively, in an enterprise setting, where your Mac is under company control, that same 20 digit hex string can be sent to your company, so they can decrypt your drive if you unexpectedly leave the company. And third alternative, you can enter three security questions + answers, the same 20 digit hex string
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It's been known for a while that any enterprise-grade encryption software worth talking about can do that. It's called key escrow, and it's necessary to recover company data should the user leave / get fired / forget their password / etc.
How is this a mystery to people?
s/kill/control (Score:2)
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Military grade technology will cost military grade bucks and will not be made generally available to the public. It will certainly not be made available for import/export on an
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Given that Apple, like Google, can push apps to the phone
Apple can't. Can Google?
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If you have automatic downloads of apps on, they most certainly do.
All my iDevices always have all new apps on them that I get on any one device, automatically. Means I can get an app in iTunes and my wifes phone will get it automatically, so I don't have to send her searching for it.
Since its optional, they certainly have the ability to do so, its up for debate as to if they can override the choice you set on the device.
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If you have automatic downloads of apps on
So it's optional, and that's updates, not new apps.
Now can Google do it?
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Well, as their actual policy states that the law enforcement agency must deliver the actual phone in good working condition, with a search warrant or court order specifically stating the IMEI and FCC ID of the device on it to Cupertino in order to get data extracted, I'm guessing that they can't simply toss a data dumper on it.
If they could just do that, then they could do that over the air.
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Clearly the intelligencia is backing open-source these days...
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Yeah, because most Android device manufacturer's legal policy about data extraction from phones is far better for privacy advocates.
Wait, where are their policies published again? They're not?