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Portables Security Hardware

Ericsson and Intel Offer Remote Notebook Lockdown 105

Posted by timothy
from the and-if-you-refuse-this-offer dept.
MojoKid writes "Ericsson and Intel have announced that they are collaborating on a way to keep your laptop's contents safe when your laptop goes MIA. Using Intel's Anti-Theft Technology — PC Protection (Intel AT-p) and Ericsson's Mobile Broadband (HSPA) modules, lost or stolen laptops can be remotely locked down. Similar to Lenovo's recently announced Lockdown Now PC technology, the Ericsson-Intel technology uses SMS messages sent directly to a laptop's mobile broadband chip. Once the chip receives the lock-down message, it passes it to the Intel AT-p function, which is integrated into Intel's Centrino 2 with vPro technology platform. Unlike Lenovo's anti-theft solution, the Ericsson module includes GPS functionality as well."
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Ericsson and Intel Offer Remote Notebook Lockdown

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  • lapjacking (Score:5, Insightful)

    by Skapare (16644) on Thursday December 11, 2008 @09:11PM (#26085419) Homepage
    And once the codes to do this leak into the wild, laptop hijacking and ransoms will be next.
    • Re:lapjacking (Score:5, Informative)

      by afidel (530433) on Thursday December 11, 2008 @09:24PM (#26085513)
      If it's like Lenovo's solution you have two levels of authentication, first the SMS number which sent the message is whitelisted (fairly easy to spoof I assume) and secondly the messages are cryptographically signed. I believe the whitelist feature is to keep from being DDOS'd with bogus messages which the card would have to attempt to decrypt.
      • by Lucky75 (1265142)
        Of course, the paranoid person would balk at having GPS tracking of their computer even without a cellphone.

        I see way too many downsides to having remote lockdown. It can be abused too easily, and once the codes get leaked, there is no added security anyways.
      • by INT_QRK (1043164)
        So...a kill code send directly to a broadband chip for a system built off-shore in government controlled factories of a potential adversary country? Oh, OK, the overt channel for the kill code is protocol "protected" and, ooooh, encrypted. I don't mean to sound paranoid, but an I the only one who sees this as at least a potential Trojan system? I sure hope our government would be astute enough to keep these things away from any mission critical shopping lists.
        • by LWATCDR (28044)

          wouldn't the built in broadband chip be a bigger danger?
          Turning off a notebook is one thing. Reading off the data is another. I mean if you are going to worry something. Broadband chip plus GPS? Shutting it down would be the last thing I would worry about.

      • Most cell providers allow you to send SMS from a websites (eg. vtext.com for Verizon) and on that you input the sending numbers, so if the actual sending numbers are used that is exactly no protection against anything except an idiot who uses his real number to wrongly try to remotely disable a laptop or DOS it.
    • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

      Unless the actual laptop owners get to set/change the codes themselves - as well as disabling the feature completely - in which case it won't be any worse than SSH/remote_desktop/et al.
      • they don't.
        at least not in my show where we are trialing it.
        this plus seagate momentus FDE disks and we're golden.

    • by dimeglio (456244)

      Can I make blow up with a simple SMS message? Reminds me of a "The Broken" episode. More thermite!

      • Re: (Score:3, Funny)

        by tomhudson (43916)

        Can I make blow up with a simple SMS message? Reminds me of a "The Broken" episode. More thermite!

        Sure - just check the "Sony Battery" option.

    • by Fluffeh (1273756)
      My name is Inigo Montoya. You stole my laptop. Prepare to shut-down.
    • by ruphus13 (890164)
      I found this laptop and started writing this reply when it suddenly froz...
      • In case you were wondering why your joke failed, let me break it down for you:

        1) You couldn't have decided to type that sentence until after the lockdown.
        2)If you had been cut off you wouldn't have added the ellipsis.

        Thank you, please try again.

    • by Jurily (900488)

      And once the codes to do this leak into the wild, laptop hijacking and ransoms will be next.

      Nah. More like a new level of DRM.

  • well (Score:5, Insightful)

    by scapermoya (769847) on Thursday December 11, 2008 @09:23PM (#26085509) Homepage
    aside from the security risks, this can only become an effective deterrent if it sees widespread use.
    good luck with that.
    • Re:well (Score:5, Insightful)

      by fuzzyfuzzyfungus (1223518) on Thursday December 11, 2008 @09:28PM (#26085569) Journal
      I suspect that this is less about deterrent and more about mitigating data loss. Laptops are cheap(and, given that this hardware and service aren't exactly going to be free) the cost of replacing some when they get stolen is probably lower than building all sorts of fancy features into them. Being able to nuke the data on the system(specifically, nuke the crypto keys to the disk's already encrypted contents) could be well worth the money for a fairly broad swath of business type purposes.
      • Here's how I would build a lock-downable laptop:

        BIOS/preboot environment: Looks to an external device, probably a USB stick, for part or all of the crypto key. Use that to decrypt boot loader on hard disk or other boot device and follow its instructions. Of course this should have a passphrase.

        Boot loader will look to whereever it chooses for crypto keys for the rest of the drive. These may be the same keys as the bootloader used or they may be something else. They may be partially or completely downlo

        • Terrible idea. Now you have yet another failure point - losing the off-drive crypto keys. You don't even need to physically lose the USB key - just break it, have it die from static discharge, etc.

          People lose things a lot more expensive all the time - ask anyone who's ever lost a cell phone, or left a laptop on the roof of their car, or lost their wallet or purse.

          • by Dan541 (1032000)

            ask anyone who's ever lost a cell phone, or left a laptop on the roof of their car, or lost their wallet or purse.

            This is /. there aren't any women here!

          • We already have an item that people use to get at something of similar value. Some of them even have a crypto key of some kind or other on them electronically. It's called a set of car keys. people lose them but it's not as bit an issue as you make out.
            • by tomhudson (43916)

              We already have an item that people use to get at something of similar value. Some of them even have a crypto key of some kind or other on them electronically. It's called a set of car keys. people lose them but it's not as bit an issue as you make out.

              Well, that's one solution - drive a car that's worth the same as laptop ... you won't need keys - just duct tape to keep it together a la "The Red Green Show." :-)

              Then again, if you put enough duct tape on your laptop, nobody's going to steal it, either -

        • My understanding is that the crypto keys are off drive, typically stored in the TPM or whatever half-assed vendor equivalent is included. That is baked into the motherboard somewhere, so it will be lost with the machine; but pulling keys out of a TPM is said to be markedly less fun than just pulling them off a drive, and features like this one are aimed at making it even more irritating. If you have to have a separable token of some kind, TPMs can be made to play with smartcards(or fingerprint scanners, if
        • What are you trying to accomplish with all these extra steps that any ordinary full disk encryption mechanism can't provide do right now?

      • I'm guessing this will only be useful for certain types of users. There are two real theft goals: either the thief is after the computer or after the data. I don't have the numbers, but I suspect the thief is after the computer (to sell on eBay, etc.) 95%+ of the time. Assuming this does actually make the computer inoperable, the thief will simply throw it out when it stops working (you won't get your computer/data back, and he doesn't care what was on the disk). If the thief needed to retrieve data from
        • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

          by networkBoy (774728)

          Intel V-pro is on even when the computer is "off" unless on battery or no AC then V-Pro is on.

          You can configure it to be:
          on in S0 only
          on in S0 and suspend
          on in S0, Suspend, Hibernate, S5 (off, living on VSB power).

          in the last mode listed it will accept a poison pill even when "off", so long as there is a network connected.

          We've got a dozen machines with this in my shop right now. pretty cool tech. Not targetted at Joe sixpack, but I could see some hard-core geeks using it to turn on their machine remotely

      • Indeed it does seem like it really is about data loss and less about theft deterrent.

        So many companies (public and private), government agencies, and individuals alike want to make sure their data is safe or at least that it doesn't fall into the hands of the bad guys.

        Funny thing is there are already at least a couple of good programs for laptop recovery [laptopcopsoftware.com] at least for Windows. (If memory serves there might be some Linux and Mac ones, too, at this point, but I digress.)

        The Ericcson/Intel offering, wh
        • no, the funny thing is you're comparing some lame remote administration application with hardware/BIOS-based security features. you might as well install netbus/Back Orifice 2000/sub7 on your computer for all the good it'll do you. all the thief has to do is take out the laptop hard drive and mount it onto another system and they've bypassed this "cutting-edge" security program developed for government use in the "War on Terror" (yes, that's an actual line used by the makers of that software).

          while the Leno

          • by RMH101 (636144)
            It's going to be controlled via security at BIOS level, *just like any other decent manufacturer-supplied protection*. I mean, think about it. You'll be using BIOS-keyed FDE built into the drive, so it's certainly not as simple as popping the drive out to read it.
      • by Alioth (221270)

        For loss of confidential data, you can already do full disc encryption using TrueCrypt (including the system disc).

      • I suspect that this is less about deterrent and more about mitigating data loss.

        In my dictionary, "data loss" means you don't have access to the data, whereas "data theft" means someone else has access to the data when they shouldn't.

        Backups protect against data loss. Remote disabling protects against data theft.

        Full disk encryption also protects against data theft if the laptop is off when stolen. Having the laptop shut down if mydnsname.org/laptop-id/shutdown doesn't 404 (cron job, every minute) would help against data theft if the laptop is on while stolen. If you have a bluetoot

      • This only works if the valuable data on the laptop is encrypted. Since, as we've seen, companies are perfectly content to put personal info of millions of people on completely unsecured computers, these kinds of features will remain in the domain of curiosity.

        Until businesses are held financially responsible for ALL damage resulting from a data breach, no feature will make data secure.

    • That, and it has to be hooked up to the internet whenever the SMS is sent. Unless of course the code does not run directly in firmware and the thief wipes the OS for a different (non-OEM in the case of Windows) one. If I stole one of these, thats what I would do, stay away from the 'net until its been wiped for Linux or a copy of retail Windows (e.g. out the box).

      But all they have to do is make this tie into firmware/BIOS so the OS running on top has 0 control, which is still easily disabled by either ph
      • Scratch that, just remove the mobile broadband chip while its off (possibly sleeping or hibernating) then have fun either reinstalling an OS on it for personal use or decrypting the hard drive and having your way with the user's data.

        Read the article this time.
        • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

          by tomhudson (43916)

          Scratch that, just remove the mobile broadband chip while its off (possibly sleeping or hibernating) then have fun either reinstalling an OS on it for personal use or decrypting the hard drive and having your way with the user's data.

          ... or just move the little switch on the front of the laptop (I didn't even notice it was there until one day I accidently turned it off and I couldn't get the wireless working).

          Removing the chip on recent HP laptops is really easy - almost as easy as upgrading ram - it's

          • by RMH101 (636144)
            Do you really think they'd be dumb enough to implement a system that you can disable with a switch? Presumably if they've half thought about this the failback when it doesn't detect a valid, working hardware module is going to be to LOCK and await the passcode.
            Presumably as standard you boot to a passcode, probably with the option to sync to Active Directory like Pointsec does, so if there's no GSM coverage you still need a password.
            • by tomhudson (43916)

              Do you really think they'd be dumb enough to implement a system that you can disable with a switch?

              Every alarm system has a switch to disarm it. A "security system" for a retail without a fallback fail mode that is user-friendly will just not be accepted.

  • by Lead Butthead (321013) on Thursday December 11, 2008 @09:24PM (#26085521) Journal

    The question is if this... feature has a government backdoor to 'assist' in 'terrorism investigation.'

    • by TheGratefulNet (143330) on Thursday December 11, 2008 @09:27PM (#26085553)

      many of us are thinking that, too.

      it took 'this long' to come out with it. but its not really a 'hard' problem. think 'coordination' and 'keys' and 'multiple owners' and I bet you are thinking what I am.

      this is a feature I would search to NOT have, quite frankly. and if I wanted it, *I* would implement it in a one-off private way.

    • by TubeSteak (669689)

      The question is if this... feature has a government backdoor to 'assist' in 'terrorism investigation.'

      Forget terrorism.
      This is a wet dream for drug dealers, organized crime, corrupt politicians etc.

      Normal procedure is to keep the computer as-is until they can do their forensics.
      So unless the police have a faraday cage or pull the HSPA chip in time, they're screwed.

      So you pretty much have to assume that there's a backdoor,
      otherwise law enforcement and the Feds would be shitting bricks.

      • by Anonymous Coward

        Please put your tinfoil hat back on.

        Drug dealers don't keep records. They especially don't keep records in/on laptops. Cellphones are a different story, but it's not like there is a sales record in there.

        In any case, any reasonably competent geek can make a laptop utterly impenetrable to forensic examination. No remote kill is required.

        I have set up encrypted systems for high security usage. My personal computer uses the same system that I sell to customers.

        1) Boot password.
        2) OS password.
        3) Encrypted s

  • ...Once the chip receives the lock-down message, it passes it to the Intel AT-p function, which is integrated into Intel's Centrino 2 with vPro technology platform. Unlike Lenovo's anti-theft solution, the Ericsson module includes GPS functionality as well..."

    In a few months, this capability will be broken to my delight. Oh wait...where is that fella "DVD Jon?"

  • horrible idea (Score:2, Informative)

    by ILuvRamen (1026668)
    So when they see that their newly stolen laptop suddenly stops functioning, what do they do? They ditch it somewhere, and I don't mean sell it. You'll NEVER get it back then. I mean yeah it's supposed to stop people from stealing your much more valuable personal data but that should be password protected anyway with a directory hider/protector (not like a compressed archive file with a password cuz that's too slow) so why bother? Now people can just fake the signal and shut your laptop off so it seems l
    • Re:horrible idea (Score:5, Insightful)

      by tomhudson (43916) <barbara.hudson@NOSpAM.barbara-hudson.com> on Thursday December 11, 2008 @10:27PM (#26086011) Journal
      It'll become a source for used/spare parts. Need a battery? A charger? A new screen because you left your lappy on the car roof and drove off? A new keyboard because you spilled crap on it? A bigger hard drive? Extra ram? A new case? A spare drive caddy and connector? A cheap DVD/Blu-Ray upgrade?

      The easily-disposed-of parts of a disassembled laptop are worth as much as the whole lappy.

      • by houghi (78078)

        The easily-disposed-of parts of a disassembled laptop are worth as much as the whole lappy.

        A thief is not in it only for money. He is in it for easymoney. He rather get 1x500EUR then 6x100EUR. Also the market for new portables is larger then the market for parts.

        • by tomhudson (43916)

          The easily-disposed-of parts of a disassembled laptop are worth as much as the whole lappy.

          A thief is not in it only for money. He is in it for easymoney. He rather get 1x500EUR then 6x100EUR. Also the market for new portables is larger then the market for parts.

          What's this "thief" do - just steal high-end macs? The market for stolen laptops is going the same way as the market for stolen DVD players ... they're getting so cheap that most people will say "Why bother?"

    • Re:horrible idea (Score:5, Insightful)

      by SanityInAnarchy (655584) <ninja@slaphack.com> on Thursday December 11, 2008 @10:44PM (#26086155) Journal

      I mean yeah it's supposed to stop people from stealing your much more valuable personal data but that should be password protected anyway with a directory hider/protector (not like a compressed archive file with a password cuz that's too slow) so why bother?

      Your ignorance is showing...

      Compressed archive files are plenty fast, depending on what you're trying to protect. The real problem is, what happens when you "open" them? Most of the time, it'll be unpacking them to a temporary directory, opening them with some random program on your (unencrypted) hard drive (likely without anything to prevent it from being swapped out, so now your stuff is on disk in the clear twice), saved back to the temporary folder (three times, if you're still counting), and put back into the archive.

      Plus, there's now a mention in Recent Documents, and all kinds of other information letting people know, at the very least, that you have some encrypted files, and what their names are.

      This applies to Truecrypt also, by the way, unless you're using it for fulldisk encryption.

      And if you're encrypting the whole disk -- where will you keep the encryption keys? How will you boot? Doing it in hardware suddenly makes sense -- probably a slight performance boost, also.

      And once you're doing that, having a way to remotely destroy the crypto keys also makes sense -- if you're paranoid enough to encrypt your whole hard drive, this is the next best thing to putting thermite in the case and triggering that remotely instead.

      It's not a deterrent, it's a way to make the crypto much more secure.

      • by novakyu (636495)

        And if you're encrypting the whole disk -- where will you keep the encryption keys? How will you boot?

        I don't know about Truecrypt, but using the standard methods in GNU/Linux (I don't even know what it's called, beyond that it uses LUKS and the command I use is called "cryptsetup"), the encryption key will be on the hard drive itself, encrypted with a symmetric cipher (and ideally you would have a reasonably strong passphrase committed to memory).

        On GNU/Linux "full disk encryption" requires a small unencrypted partition which contains the kernel and initrd, and initrd has the tools to decrypt the other par

        • the encryption key will be on the hard drive itself, encrypted with a symmetric cipher (and ideally you would have a reasonably strong passphrase committed to memory).

          In which case, it's still a passphrase that must be remembered, and typed every boot -- which means there's an incentive for keeping it short and easy to remember.

          On GNU/Linux "full disk encryption" requires a small unencrypted partition which contains the kernel and initrd, and initrd has the tools to decrypt the other partition and continue the full booting process.

          It's actually trivial to just put /boot on a separate partition. What I used to do is keep /boot on a USB key, without a passphrase -- the assumption being that it was unlikely that both the laptop (in my backpack) and the key (in my pocket) would be stolen at the same time, and that the attacker would figure it out.

          This is still better -- if the

      • And if you're encrypting the whole disk -- where will you keep the encryption keys? How will you boot? Doing it in hardware suddenly makes sense -- probably a slight performance boost, also.

        You encrypt the disk with a master key K. Each user has a password p_u and a key generated from the password, K_u = pbkdf(p_u). Store K encrypted under K_u, for all u, on the disk. The user inputs his password on bootup, the system computes K_u, decrypts K, and is ready to use it for decrypting the disk.

        You can destroy the keys with a little bit of dd magic; ask shred for some bit patterns, and/or add some layers of cryptographically random data.

        If your CPU has the "aes" instruction, doing crypto in soft

  • by MrCrassic (994046) <deprecated&ema,il> on Thursday December 11, 2008 @09:32PM (#26085613) Journal
    It won't solve for another problem: losing the computer in an area without signal (like a train).

    If the thief is smart (which is normally not the case), he can remove the hard drive right on the train or in that same area and completely avoid the SMS message. Unless, of course, the SMS can somehow be sent to the security chip without the interference of an operating system.

    When I lost my Treo in the subway, the Good administrator for my hosted email service could not remote wipe the phone because it could never find service. It's possible that someone removed the SIM right away, but I'm sure that I lost it while getting off the train.

    Nonetheless, it's a great idea that covers many other common circumstances. Fortunately, most thieves are petty thieves and wouldn't know that this module is there in the first place.
    • by afidel (530433)
      That's why Blackberry's are better than Treo's with Good, as soon as the device can talk GPRS or better it will get the wipe signal based on its PIN, it's not tied to the SIM.
      • by MrCrassic (994046)
        There are a lot of reasons why Blackberry devices are better than anything Good Technology can put out. Start with the basic stuff like UI and work your way up.
        • There are a lot of reasons why Blackberry devices are better than anything Good Technology can put out. Start with the basic stuff like UI and work your way up.

          There's actually a company called Good Technology?

          That's disappointing. I thought when the GP poster said "the Good Admin" he was talking about a company that had one Good Admin, several Incompetent Admins (who nuke the wrong laptops) and one Highly Competent but Evil Admin (he knows he's nuking it after you got it returned, but you can't prove he knows).

    • by ceoyoyo (59147) on Thursday December 11, 2008 @10:06PM (#26085875)

      Foil lined laptop bags. For the modern laptop thief on the run.

  • So, anybody else remember when we talked about [slashdot.org] "digital manners policies", the delightful form of DRM where devices selectively disobey you based on their environments?

    Well, reading the patent application linked to in that article should give you all kinds of delightful ideas about what you could do with a computer that has some sort of embedded supervisor processor with GPS and a cell data link...
  • They're talking about the processor and stuff, but what about the hard drive? I mean, in a list of what I want secured, isn't the HD the first thing anyone would check? What about it? There's nothing in the article, looks like an infomercial if you ask me...
    • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

      by afidel (530433)
      I'm assuming they are using the secure instruction included in recent Intel CPU's to talk to the TPM1.2 chip in the laptop and deleting the decrypt key from the keystore therefore making the recovery from FDE like BitLocker basically impossible.
      • First rule of data security: assume nothing.

      • by rogere (1353247)
        Ok so you retain your privacy even if you lose your comp... unless as some said you take out the HD before the SMS, or add some tinfoil... but as some more said the thieves are in it for the hardware. Still if I were to steal private info, I guess I wouldn't bother and go for the recycle bin. Still seriously paranoÃd is one to buy that.
        • by afidel (530433) on Thursday December 11, 2008 @10:39PM (#26086101)
          Taking the HDD out gains you NOTHING, in theory it's already fully encrypted with 256 bit AES which is uncrackable by any currently known method. The idea is that there is only one real vulnerability in a TPM based system and that is the TPM chip's keystore and the databus that the TPM chip uses to talk to the CPU, if you erase the keystore and thus makes sure that both those pathways are neutralized there should be no possible way to retrieve the data off the disk. There's still the cooled RAM trick and possibly a trace of the key left in the disk controller's cache, but those are both VERY sophisticated attacks that have a very low chance of working even in lab conditions. Oh and I just thought of something, if the TPM keystore is wiped then the TPM trust web collapses and the machine should reboot thus flushing the key from ram.
  • by Matt Perry (793115) <perry.matt54@NoSpam.yahoo.com> on Thursday December 11, 2008 @10:00PM (#26085829)

    No problem. Laptops are worth more when you sell the parts individually rather than the whole thing.

    • No problem. Laptops are worth more when you sell the parts individually rather than the whole thing.

      Like Cars?

    • No problem. Laptops are worth more when you sell the parts individually rather than the whole thing.

      Only most of the parts though, I still end up with the stripped carcasses propped up on bricks in the front yard.

      My bitch neighbour Lurleen done called the sheriff about that again.

  • by Phizzle (1109923) on Thursday December 11, 2008 @10:57PM (#26086237) Homepage
    Another great "Big Brother" innovation. Can't you just imagine, during the next "threat escalation" all laptops get cockblocked "just in case" for the Greater Good ®, of the patriotic nation?
    • Re: (Score:2, Funny)

      by Hal_Porter (817932)

      DHSS eCleanup squad to slashdot sid 08/12/12/0050255, stat! We've got ourselves a rowdy one.

  • sales of lead-lined suitcases have increased heavily.
  • Remember war dialling? Well, as soon as you know the SMS string, you can now start walking through number ranges and "lock" laptops - a whole new DoS attack :-) Cool :-)
  • Relying on cell phone communication? If it's GSM, it's already been p0wn3d. info [binrev.com]. At the moment, it's only within reach of large corporations, but those barriers are artificial. There's also been development on creating a fake base station using a USRP (google it), a very nice piece of hardware kit that can do the signals processing necessary... So the hardware exists for $1000 to pull this hack off. Failing that, just pop the screws and cut the antenna leads to the internal wifi (which is likely the same

    • P.S. Taking out the battery works too. ^_^ Then just flip your cell phone open, find a place with zero bars, and plop down.

      If you want to be fancy, build yourself a small faraday cage. Woo-woo...

      For This Project You Will Need:
      * replacement outdoor screening material, approx. 200sqft. You can get this at a Fleet Farm or online.
      * 4 2x8s
      * 2 2x16s,
      * 1 50" extension cord,
      * six metal rods approx. 6" in length (suggest construction reed bar)
      * power stapler
      * wood glue (or similar)
      * hacksaw
      * pile driver

      Note: You don

  • by Ofloo (1378781)
    This is privacy for security, .. sony will be able to track when you are online and where you are, with there gps module, .. this is not something i'm waiting for and what if there is an exploit in the system and it gets widely available to hackers, .. nothing is perfect, but such things shouldn't be in a computer, this is asking for trouble.
  • Intel AT-p

    2200 Mission College Blvd., Santa Clara, CA 95054-1537

  • humm. another trustworthy firmware piece of code I have no control of. great. but why should I care - I'm running a open platform ! i can verify every single line of code I'm running ! think again. the hw barrier endures - coding is much easier than pcb printing. So you end up with g00gle pitching android as 'open and free' while restricting any root privileges, your TPM chip busy DRM'ing on your behalf & your TiVo phoning home. how long until your LCD denies you playing videos ? what will prevent Sony

  • Undercover, from Orbicule, has been doing something similar for Mac laptops for a long time:

    http://www.orbicule.com/ [orbicule.com]

  • If I can lock down my laptop, then how long until criminals and crackers find a way to lock it down as well using the same technology as a new DoS attack?

    I think the problem of theft can be solved very easily by just not storing any data on any local machine, store everything on your own servers instead.

  • Encrypt your laptops already! Jeesh. I guess people will pay money for all kinds of services that supposedly keep laptops safe. All the tools to keep your information safe already exist, but people simply refuse to use them. Encrypt your data and it will be safe (assuming you use a decent passphrase or key).

Passwords are implemented as a result of insecurity.

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